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There are several three-valued logical systems that form a scattered landscape, even if
all reasonable connectives in three-valued logics can be derived from a few of them.
Most papers on this subject neglect the issue of the relevance of such logics in relation
with the intended meaning of the third truth-value. Here, we focus on the case where the
third truth-value means unknown, as suggested by Kleene. Under such an understanding,
we show that any truth-qualified formula in a large range of three-valued logics can be
translated into KD as a modal formula of depth 1, with modalities in front of literals only,
while preserving all tautologies and inference rules of the original three-valued logic.
This simple information logic is a two-tiered classical propositional logic with simple
semantics in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of classical interpretations.
We study in particular the translations of Kleene, Gödel, Łukasiewicz and Nelson logics.
We show that Priest’s logic of paradox, closely connected to Kleene’s, can also be
translated into our modal setting, simply by exchanging the modalities possible and
necessary. Our work enables the precise expressive power of three-valued logics to be
laid bare for the purpose of uncertainty management.
Keywords: three-valued logics; modal logic; uncertainty; incomplete information
1. Introduction
Classical Boolean logic has a remarkable advantage over many other logics: the definition
of its basic connectives is clear and consensual, even if the truth-values true (1) and false (0)
can be interpreted in practice in different ways. Moreover, there is complete agreement on
its model-based semantics. Its formal setting seems to ideally capture the ‘targeted reality’,
that of propositions being true or false in each possible world. The situation is quite different
with many-valued logics, where we replace the two truth-values with an ordered set with
more than two truth-values. The simplest case is three-valued logic, where we add a single
intermediate value, here denoted by 12 . Naively, we might think that three-valued logic
should be as basic as Boolean logic: the set {0, 12 , 1} is the simplest example of a bipolar
scale (Dubois & Prade, 2008), isomorphic to the set of signs {−, 0,+}. However, there are
quite a number of three-valued logics, since the extension to three values of the Boolean
connectives is not unique. Worse still, there is no agreement on the intuitive interpretation
of this third truth-value in the literature. Several interpretations have been proposed. Here
is a (probably not exhaustive) list:
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(1) Possible: the oldest interpretation due to Łukasiewicz (Borowski, 1970). Unfor-
tunately, it seems to have introduced some confusion between modalities and
truth-values that is still looming in some parts of the many-valued logic literature
(see the discussions in Font & Hájek, 2002).
(2) Half-true: the natural understanding in formal fuzzy logic (Hájek, 1998): if it is true
that a man of height 1.80 m. is tall, and it is false that a man of height 1.60 m. is
tall, then we can think that it is half-true that a man of height 1.70 m. is tall. In this
view, truth becomes a matter of degree (Zadeh, 1975). Then 12 captures the idea of
borderline.
(3) Undefined: this vision is typical of the studies on recursive functions modelled by
logical formulas and can be found in Kleene (1952). A formula is not defined if
some of its arguments are out of its domain. So, in this case, the third truth-value
has a contaminating effect through recursion.
(4) Unknown: Kleene (1952) also suggests this alternative interpretation of the inter-
mediate value. It is the most usual point of view outside the fuzzy set community.
Unfortunately, it suffers from confusion between truth-value and epistemic state,
which generates paradoxes (Dubois, 2008; Dubois & Prade, 2001; Urquhart, 1986),
just like the Łukasiewicz proposal, if truth-functionality is assumed.
(5) Inconsistent: in some sense, this is the dual of ‘unknown’. Several paraconsistent
logics try to tame the notion of contradiction by means of a truth-functional logic
(da Costa & Alves, 1981; Priest, 1979), for instance, while Belnap (1977) considers
both unknown and inconsistent as additional truth-values. This standpoint has been
criticised as also generating paradoxes (Dubois, 2008; Fox, 1990).
(6) Irrelevant: this point of view is similar to ‘undefined’ but with the opposite effect:
abstention. If a component of a formula has 12 as a truth-value, the truth-value of the
whole formula is determined by the remaining components. This is at work in the
logic of Sobocin´ski (1952), and the logic of conditional events (Dubois & Prade,
1994).
In the present work,1 we are interested in the fourth interpretation of the third truth-
value 12 , unknown, popularised by Kleene (1952) (this includes the Łukasiewicz view).
Kleene logic has been used in logic programming (Fitting, 1985), formal concept analysis
(Burmeister & Holzer, 2005) and databases (Codd, 1979; Grant, 1980) to model such notions
as null-values.
However, the use of a truth-functional logic such as Kleene or Łukasiewicz logic
accounting for the idea of unknown has always been controversial (see discussions in
Urquhart, 1986, and more recently the second author, Dubois, 2008). In a nutshell, the loss of
properties such as the law of excluded middle when moving from two to three truth-values,
including unknown, sounds questionable. Indeed, in Kleene logic, the negation operation
applied to 12 yields
1
2 : so if a proposition α is assigned
1
2 , its negation¬α is also assigned 12 ,
and so are the disjunction α ⊔ ¬α and the conjunction α ⊓ ¬α. Typically, assigning 12 to
α may mean that the available recursive computation method cannot decide whether α is
true or false, hence not for its negation ¬α and so, not for α ⊔¬α, α ⊓¬α either. However,
if the actual truth-value of α is 0 or 1, any expression of the form α ⊔ ¬α cannot be but
assigned 1, and likewise 0 to α ⊓ ¬α, even if the procedure cannot find it recursively. It is
easy to let the computer detect these patterns and avoid assigning 12 to such ontic tautologies
or contradictions.
As a matter of fact, if the third truth-value means unknown, this suggests that the corre-
sponding three-valued logic aims at capturing epistemic notions, as does the Łukasiewicz
view of possible as a third truth-value. Clearly, unknown means that true and false are
possible.2 So it is natural to bridge the gap between such three-valued logics and modal
epistemic logics. In 1921, Tarski had already conceived of the idea of translating the
modalities possible and necessary into Łukasiewicz three-valued logic. The modal possible
is defined on {0, 12 , 1} as ♦x = ¬x→L x = min{2x, 1} with Łukasiewicz negation and
implication. In this translation, possible thus means that the truth-value is at least 12 . So
the question is, which of these two is the most suitable language for handling partial
ignorance – modal logic or three-valued logic? This paper addresses this issue for the class
of three-valued logics with monotonic conjunctions and implications that extend Boolean
connectives, by translating them into a very elementary modal logic, less expressive even
than S5.
This point of view is opposite to Tarski’s: rather than trying to translate modal logic into
a three-valued one (which is provably hopeless; see Béziau, 2011), it seems more feasible
and fruitful to do the converse. We propose a theorem-preserving translation of three-valued
logics in a modal setting. According to the epistemic nature of the interpretation of 12 here
chosen, the framework of some epistemic logic looks like a natural choice for a target
language. Unsurprisingly, as is shown in the following, modal logic is more expressive
than all the three-valued logics of unknown. Note that the idea of using modal logic as a
general target language for explicating logics with more concise languages is in fact not
new. The oldest similar attempt is that of Gödel (1933), who provided a theorem-preserving
translation of intuitionistic logic into the modal logic S4, a translation studied in more
detail by McKinsey and Tarski (1948). Translations of three-valued logics into modal logic
are not new either. For instance, Duffy (1979), and very recently Kooi and Tamminga
(2013), use S5 as a target language. Minari (2002) applies the above Tarski expression
of the modal possible to Wajsberg axioms of Łukasiewicz logic, and studies the resulting
modal system. More generally, Demri (2000) has proposed an embedding of finite many-
valued logics into von Wright’s logic of elsewhere. We can also cite the modal translation
of the five-valued equilibrium logic into a bimodal logic with only two possible worlds, by
Fariñas del Cerro and Herzig (2011). In many cases, the semantics on the modal side relies
on Kripke-style relations.
The main contribution of the paper is to point out that we do not need the full language
of S5 in order to capture three-valued logics exactly in a modal setting, let alone fully
fledged accessibility relations for the semantics. A very simple two-tiered propositional
logic called Minimal Epistemic Logic (MEL; Banerjee & Dubois, 2009),3 with a very
simple and intuitive semantics, is enough to capture Łukasiewicz logics, hence all other
three-valued logics in the class we consider here. It is an elementary variant of epistemic
logic, sufficient for declaring a Boolean proposition to be unknown at the syntactic level. Its
language is a fragment of the KD language, with modal formulas of depth 1 and modalities
in front of literals only. The motivation of this translation is to better understand the meaning
of three-valued connectives and formulas in the scope of handling incomplete information.
Moreover, the above cited translations into S5, like Kooi and Tamminga (2013), focus on
the separation between valid, invalid and contingent formulas only (as expected with S5).
In contrast, here we deal with the issue of inference of a formula from a set of formulas
in three-valued logics, and show that it translates into inference from a knowledge base in
MEL.
The paper develops as follows: first, we recall MEL, where we can express only Boolean
propositional formulas prefixed by a modality and Boolean combinations thereof. It has a
simple semantics in term of non-empty subsets of interpretations. In Section 3, we review
truth-tables for basic connectives of three-valued logics under minimal requirements of
monotonicity and coincidence with Boolean truth-tables, and recall that only very few
connectives are needed to generate all the other ones (we essentially need the minimum
and its residuated implication, plus an involutive negation). Some three-valued logics like
Łukasiewicz’s can express all the others. In Section 4, we show how it is possible to express
semantic constraints on the truth-value of three-valued propositions by means of Boolean
modal formulas, and we describe the one-to-one correspondence between three-valued
valuations and partial classical models. In the remaining sections, we provide theorem-
preserving translations of several three-valued logics into MEL. We lay bare in each case
the proper fragment of the language of MEL that can encode the translation of these three-
valued logics. Section 5 deals with three-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł3 and shows that it
exactly corresponds to the fragment of the MEL language where modalities are placed
only in front of literals. We also show that reasoning from a set of formulas in Ł3 can be
achieved in MEL by classical inference from its translation. We also translate Nelson logic
(also LPF in Avron, 1991), which is known to be equivalent to Ł3. Section 6 considers
the translation into MEL of other logics that are less expressive than Ł3 (Kleene and
Gödel-Heyting three-valued logics), plus a semantic variant of Kleene logic (the logic
of paradox) which is paraconsistent. Section 7 wraps up the results obtained so far, com-
paring the modal translations of all fourteen truth-qualified three-valued conjunctions and
implications laid bare in Section 3. Perspectives toward translations of other multi-valued
logics, having different intuitions, into the modal setting are outlined.
2. A simple information logic
The usual truth-values true (1) and false (0) are ontological in nature (which means that they
are part of the definition of what we call proposition, and not that they represent Platonist
ideals), whereas unknown sounds epistemic: it reveals a knowledge state according to which
the truth-value of a proposition (in the usual Boolean sense) in a given situation is out of reach
(one cannot compute it, due to either a lack of computing power or a lack of information). It
corresponds to the epistemic state of an agent that can assert neither the truth of a Boolean
proposition nor its falsity.
Admitting that the concept of ‘unknown’ refers to a knowledge state rather than to an
ontic truth-value, we may, instead of adding a specific truth-value, augment the syntax of
Boolean propositional logic (BPL) with the capability of stating that we ignore the truth-
value (1 or 0) of propositions. The natural framework to syntactically encode knowledge
or belief regarding Boolean propositions is modal logic, and in particular, the logic KD.
Nevertheless, only a very limited fragment of this language is needed here: the language of
MEL; see Banerjee and Dubois (2009) and Banerjee & Dubois (2013).
Consider a set of propositional variables V = {a, b, c, . . . , p, . . . } and a standard
propositional language L built on these symbols along with the Boolean connectives of
conjunction and negation (∧,′ ).As usual, disjunction α∨β stands for (α′∧β ′)′, implication
α ⇒ β stands for α′ ∨ β, and tautology ⊤ for α ∨ α′. Let us build another propositional
language L whose set of propositional variables is of the form V = {α : α ∈ L} to
which the classical connectives can be applied. It is endowed with a modality operator
 expressing certainty, which encapsulates formulas in L. We denote by α, β, . . . the
propositional formulas of L, and φ,ψ, . . . the modal formulas of L. In other words:
L = α : α ∈ L|φ′|φ ∧ ψ |φ ∨ ψ |φ ⇒ ψ.
The logic MEL uses the language L with the following axioms:
(1) φ ⇒ (ψ ⇒ φ);
(2) (ψ ⇒ (φ ⇒ µ))⇒ ((ψ ⇒ φ)⇒ (ψ ⇒ µ));
(3) (φ′ ⇒ ψ ′)⇒ (ψ ⇒ φ);
(RM) : α ⇒ β if ⊢ α ⇒ β in BPL;
(M) : (α ∧ β)⇒ (α ∧β);
(C) : (α ∧β)⇒ (α ∧ β);
(N) : ⊤;
(D) : α ⇒ ♦α.
The inference rule is modus ponens. As usual, the modality possible (♦) is defined as
♦α ≡ (α′)′. The first three axioms are those of BPL and the other ones are those of modal
logic KD. In this setting, (M) and (C) can be replaced with axiom (K):
(K) : (α ⇒ β)⇒ (α ⇒ β).
This points out the fact that the MELlanguage is the ‘subjective’fragment of the language
of S5 (i.e., the one without ‘objective’ Boolean formulas α combined or not with modal
ones). We can justify the minimality property of the modal language L for reasoning about
incomplete information: in L, we can only express at the syntactic level that a proposition
in BPL is certainly true, certainly false or unknown, as well as all the logical combinations
of these assertions.
The MEL semantics is very simple but it stands in contrast with usual modal semantics
in terms of accessibility relations, which are not needed here as we do not nest modalities.
Let  be the set of L-interpretations: {ω : V → {0, 1}}. The set of models of α is [α] =
{ω : ω |= α}. A (meta)-interpretation of L is a non-empty set E ⊆  of interpretations of
L understood as an epistemic state.4 We define satisfiability as follows:
• E |= ✷α if E ⊆ [α] (α is certainly true in the epistemic state E);
• E |= φ ∧ ψ if E |= φ and E |= ψ ;
• E |= φ′ if E |= φ is false.
MEL is sound and complete with respect to this semantics (Banerjee & Dubois, 2009;
for a direct proof, see Banerjee, Dubois, Prade, & Schockaert, 2013; Banerjee & Dubois,
2013).
The following comments serve to position our simple information logic with respect to
the standard way of envisaging modal epistemic logics and uncertainty theories:
• Unlike epistemic logics, MEL is not a flat extension of propositional logic enriched
with modal symbols. It is a two-tiered logic, where both layers are propositional.
Its language L is disjoint from L, contrary to the language of S5. Moreover, the
deduction theorem holds in MEL, contrary to usual modal logics.
• In standard modal logic, the set of models of ✷α is a subset of , just as BPL
propositions α (all the interpretations whose images via the accessibility relation
are included in the set of models of α), while here, the set of models of ✷α is a
subset of the power set of .
• We can debate whether MEL is an epistemic or a doxastic logic. Our formalism
does not take sides, since axiom (D) is valid in both S5 and KD45 and axiom (T)
of knowledge (✷α ⇒ α) is not expressible in MEL. We kept the term ‘epistemic’
in reference to the idea of an information state, whether it is consistent with reality
or not. Moreover, MEL is not concerned with introspection, and only deals with
reasoning about the beliefs revealed by an external agent.
• We remark that in this framework, uncertainty modelling is Boolean and can be
described in possibility theory (Dubois & Prade, 2001). The satisfiability E |= ♦α
means E ∩ [α] 6= ∅. By definition, it can be written as 5([α]) = 1 in the sense
of a possibility measure 5 computed with the possibility distribution given by the
characteristic function of the non-empty set E . Intuitively, E |= ♦α then means
that the agent does not have enough information for discarding α as being false, or
in other words, that α does not contradict the agent’s epistemic state. Likewise, the
satisfiability E |= ✷α can be written as N ([α]) = 1−5([α]) = 1 in the sense of a
necessity measure. It expresses the certainty that α is true. Axioms (M) and (C) lay
bare the connection with possibility theory, as they state the equivalence between
α∧β and(α∧β) (which can also be written as N (α∧β) = min(N (α), N (β))).
In probabilistic terms, ♦α stands for the probability of α being positive, while
✷α expresses that the probability of α is 1, provided that E is the support of the
distribution.
3. Connectives in three-valued logics
The idea that unknown can be a truth-value seems to originate from a common usage in
natural language, creating a confusion between true and certainly true (or yet provable),
false and certainly false. Indeed, in the spoken language, saying ‘it is true that. . .’ is often
short for ‘I know it is true that. . .’. We mix up, in this way, the idea of truth per se with
the assertion of truth. The latter reveals something about the information possessed by the
speaker (its epistemic state), namely that he or she knows that a proposition is true. The
value unknown attached to a proposition α (♦α ∧ ♦α′ in MEL) is thus in conflict with
certainly true (✷α) and certainly false (✷α′), not with the ontological truth-values true
and false. In this context, it sounds strange to add unknown to the usual truth-set as a fully
fledged truth-value.
Accordingly, we shall not use the same symbols for Boolean truth-values and those of
the three-valued logic as long as 12 means unknown. For the sake of clarity, we will use 0
and 1 for ontic truth-values in the Boolean case, and boldface 0 and 1 for their epistemic
counterparts in the three-valued case. The truth set 3 = {0, 12 , 1} contains epistemic values,
as opposed to 0 and 1. Moreover, we equip 3 with a total order≤: 0 < 12 < 1, often referred
to as the truth ordering (Belnap, 1977).
Three-valued logics assume that connectives are compositional. Conjunction, implica-
tion and negation on the set of values 3 can be defined by minimal intuitive properties.
Definition 1. A conjunction on (3,≤) is a binary mapping ∗ from 3× 3 to 3 such that
(C1) If x ≤ y then x ∗ z ≤ y ∗ z;
(C2) If x ≤ y then z ∗ x ≤ z ∗ y;
(C3) 0 ∗ 0 = 0 ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ 0 = 0 and 1 ∗ 1 = 1.
We note that (C3) requires that ∗ be an extension of the connective AND in Boolean
logic. Then, the monotonicity properties (C1 and C2) imply 12 ∗ 0 = 0 ∗ 12 = 0. If we
consider all the possible cases, there are fourteen conjunctions satisfying Definition 1.
Among them, only six are commutative and only five associative. These five conjunctions
are already known in the literature, and have been studied in the following logics: Sette
Table 1. All conjunctions on 3 according to Definition 1.
(1973), Sobocin´ski (1952), Łukasiewicz (Borowski, 1970), Kleene (1952), and Bochvar
(1981). In Table 1, we list all fourteen conjunctions.
The idempotent and commutative Kleene conjunction and disjunction (the minimum,
denoted by ⊓, and the maximum, denoted by ⊔) are present in 3 due to the total order
assumption (x ⊓ y = y ⊓ x = x if and only if x ≤ y.)
In the case of implication, we can give a general definition, which extends Boolean logic
and supposes monotonicity (decreasing in the first argument, increasing in the second).
Definition 2. An implication on (3,≤) is a binary mapping→ from 3× 3 to 3 such that
(I1) If x ≤ y then y ⇒ z ≤ x → z;
(I2) If x ≤ y then z ⇒ x ≤ z → y;
(I3) 0 → 0 = 1 → 1 = 1 and 1 → 0 = 0.
From the above definition we derive the identities x → 1 = 1, 0 → x = 1 and the
inequality 12 → 12 ≥ max(1 → 12 , 12 → 0). There are fourteen implications satisfying this
definition. Nine of them are known in the literature and have been studied. Besides those
implications named after the five logics mentioned above, there are also those named after
Jas´kowski (1969), Gödel (1932), Nelson (1949), and Gaines-Rescher (Gaines, 1976).
The complete list is given in Table 2.
Gödel implication (line 10 in Table 2) is present in the lattice (3,≤) using the residuation
x ⊓ y ≤ z if and only if x ≤ y →G z,
such that y →G z = 1 if y ≤ z and z otherwise. Then (3,≤) is called a Heyting chain.
There are only three possible negations that extend the Boolean negation, that is, preserve
0′ = 1 and 1′ = 0:
(1) ∼ 12 = 0. We call it an intuitionistic negation (as it satisfies the law of contradiction,
not the excluded middle law).
(2) ¬ 12 = 12 . It is an involutive negation.
(3) − 12 = 1. We call it a paraconsistent negation (as it satisfies the law of excluded
middle, not the one of contradiction).
Table 2. All implications on 3 according to Definition 2.
The intuitionistic negation is definable by means of Gödel implication and the truth-
constant 0 as ∼x = x →G 0, and the paraconsistent one using Nelson implication instead,
as −x = x →N 0.
Finally, despite the existence of several known systems of three-valued logics, we
can use, in the above setting, only one encompassing three-valued structure to express
all connectives. That is, all the connectives satisfying the above definitions, can be obtained
from a structure equipped with few primitive ones (Ciucci & Dubois, 2013b). In the
following, we denote by 3 the set of three elements without any structure and by 3 the
same set equipped with the usual order 0 < 12 < 1 or equivalently, 3 = (3,⊓,→G).
Proposition 3 (Ciucci & Dubois, 2013b). All fourteen conjunctions and implications can
be expressed in any of the following systems:
• (3,¬) = (3,⊓,→G ,¬);
• (3,→K ) where→K is Kleene implication (x →5 y = ¬x ⊔ y);
• (3,→L , 0) where→L is Łukasiewicz implication (x →11 y = min(1, 1− x+ y));
• (3,→K ,∼, 0) where→K is Kleene implication and ∼ the intuitionistic negation.
So, in the first two cases, we assume a Heyting chain, whereas in the other two, we
can derive it from the other connectives. We also remark that the intuitionistic negation can
be replaced with the paraconsistent negation in the last item. The above result differs from
functional completeness, since Proposition 3 only deals with three-valued functions that
coincide with Boolean connectives on {0, 1}.
4. The principles of the translation
Let T be a truth set and S ⊆ T a non-empty subset of truth-values.Atruth-qualified statement
is of the form: the truth-value of α lies in S, where α is a formula in some language. It means
that only the truth-values in S are possible for α in the considered knowledge state of an
agent (the values outside S are impossible).
In the case of Boolean logic, we consider statements t (α) ∈ S ⊆ {0, 1} where t is a
Boolean valuation. It is a possibly incomplete description of the agent knowledge about the
truth state of α in the current state of the world. We can then model epistemic terms certainly
true, certainly false and unknown by the respective subsets of Boolean truth-values S = {1},
{0} and {0, 1}.5 For instance, the truth-qualified statement t (α) ∈ {1} encodes certainly true
since the only possible truth-value is 1 (true). Mixing up the ontological true and the
epistemic certainly true is the same as confusing an element with a singleton.
In the following we consider a three-valued logic based on propositional variables
V = {a, b, c, . . . , p, . . . }. Stricto sensu, we should not use the same notation for three-
valued propositional variables and Boolean ones. However, we will do it for the sake of
simplicity. If v is a three-valued valuation, the assertion v(a) ∈ S ⊆ 3 is a partial description
of the knowledge state of an agent concerning an atomic Boolean proposition a. Here, we
identify {1} with 1, {0} with 0, and {0, 1} with 12 , and consider 3 as a set of epistemic truth-
values. For instance, v(a) ∈ {0, 12 } means that we know the agent is either certain that a is
false, or ignores if a is true or not. In the following this is the kind of statement we shall
translate into MEL.
4.1. From three-valued truth-qualified statements to MEL
Let L3 denote a language supporting the three-valued connectives introduced in the previous
section. If we interpret the three epistemic truth-values 0, 1, 12 as certainly true, certainlyfalse and unknown respectively, we can translate into MEL the assignment of one or more
of such truth-values to a proposition α ∈ L3. Let V be the set of three-valued valuations
on the set of variables V . We denote by T (v(α) ∈ S) the translation into MEL of the
set {v : v(α) ∈ S} corresponding to the statement v(α) ∈ S. Formally, it is a function
T : 2V → L from subsets of ternary valuations to the modal language L :
{v : v(α) ∈ S} 7→ φ = T (v(α) ∈ S). In the special case of atomic propositions, we
define it as follows, in agreement with the intended meaning of the epistemic truth-values:
T (v(a) = 1) = a T (v(a) = 0) = a′
from which it follows:
T
(
v(a) ≥ 12
)
= ♦a; T
(
v(a) ≤ 12
)
= ♦a′;
T
(
v(a) = 12
)
= ♦a ∧ ♦a′; T (v(a) ∈ {0, 1}) = ✷a ∨✷a′.
These definitions shed light on the acceptability or not of the excluded middle law and
the contradiction principle in the presence of the value unknown: a is always ontologically
true or false, but in MEL,a ∨a′ is not a tautology, and ♦a ∧♦a′ is not a contradiction.
The former means that it is known that the agent knows the truth-value of a but the agent
did not reveal it.
Given this translation method it becomes clear that the assignment of ‘truth-values’ to
any formula in a three-valued logic can be translated into a formula in MEL obtained by
combining atomic formulas of the forma,a′ for variables a∈V . Indeed, each expression
in a three-valued logic is the combination of subformulas by some sort of primitive unary
or binary connective defined by a truth-table. Assigning a truth-value to the formula (e.g.,
1) leads to constraints on the truth-values of the subformulas, which in turn determines
constraints on the truth-values of subsubformulas, and so on, until reaching constraints
on the truth-value of elementary variables of the language, all of which can be translated
into MEL as per the above translation rules. It is clear that the original formula will be
translated into a logical formula in MEL where involved connectives express Boolean
dependencies between constraints on the truth-values of three-valued variables. Under the
above translation principles it is clear that any translated truth-qualified three-valued formula
will belong to a fragment of the MEL language where we can put modalities only in front
of literals, that is, Lℓ

⊂ L defined by
Lℓ

= a|a′|φ′|φ ∧ ψ |φ ∨ ψ.
4.2. From three-valued semantics to epistemic semantics
At the semantic level, we shall map three-valued valuations to special epistemic states that
serve as interpretations of the sublanguage Lℓ

of MEL. Given a three-valued
valuation v, a partial Boolean model, denoted by Ev , is naturally defined by t (a) = 1
if and only if v(a) = 1, and t (a) = 0 if and only if v(a) = 0. Such an epistemic
state Ev has a particular (rectangular) form that makes it a partial model: it is the set of
Boolean models of a non-contradictory conjunction of literals ∧v(a)=1a
∧∧v(a)=0a′. So,
the consequence of interpreting the third truth-value as unknown is that we must interpret
three-valued valuations as partial models, which are special cases of MEL interpretations.
Conversely, to any MEL interpretation E (a disjunction of propositional interpretations)
we can assign a single three-valued interpretation vE defined as follows:
∀a, vE (a) =


1 E  a
0 E  a′
1
2 otherwise.
The map E 7→ vE is not bijective. It defines an equivalence relation on epistemic states.
Namely, {E : vE = v} is the set of epistemic states that are indistinguishable by the three-
valued valuation v. Define the rectangular closure of a set E of propositional valuations
as the set of models of ∧E⊆[a]a
∧∧E⊆[a′]a′ (the conjunctions of literals known as true in
the epistemic state E). Clearly, Ev = ∪{E : vE = v} is the unique partial Boolean model
induced by v, and is the rectangular closure r(E) of any epistemic state E ∈ {E : vE = v}.
Note that ∀v ∈ V, Ev 6= ∅.
We can show that the MEL logic restricted to the language Lℓ

is sound and complete
with respect to the set of partial models of the propositional language L.
Lemma 4. ∀φ ∈ Lℓ

,∀E ∈ 2 \ {∅}, E |= φ if and only if r(E) |= φ.
Proof. We proceed by induction.
For a literal a of BPL, if E |= ✷a, then E is the set of models of a formula of the
form a ∧ α, where α does not contain the variable associated with a. It is then clear that
r(E) = a ∧ r([α]), hence r(E) ⊆ [a]. The converse is obvious.
Suppose E |= (✷a)′, that is E 6|= ✷a. Hence r(E) 6|= ✷a either, since E ⊆ r(E).
Conversely, we know that if E |= ✷a then r(E) |= ✷a from the previous lines.
For conjunction, since ✷a ∧ ✷b is equivalent to ✷(a ∧ b) for two literals a and b,
then, if E |= ✷(a ∧ b), E is the set of models of a formula of the form a ∧ b ∧ β; the
same technique as for literals can be used to conclude the equivalence with r(E) ⊆ [a∧b].
More generally, in formulas ✷α ∈ Lℓ

, the BPL formula α corresponds to a conjunction of
literals.
For disjunctions, E |= ✷α∨✷β is equivalent to E |= ✷α or E |= ✷β, which (inductive
assumption) is equivalent to r(E) |= ✷α or r(E) |= ✷β, which in turn is equivalent to
r(E) |= ✷α ∨✷β. 
Proposition 5. Let φ be a formula and Ŵ a set of formulas in the language of Lℓ

. Then,
Ŵ ⊢ φ if and only if ∀v ∈ V, Ev |= Ŵ implies Ev |= φ.
This is a direct consequence of Lemma 4. This result leads us to the completeness of
MEL restricted to the language Lℓ

with respect to a three-valued semantics defined by
v |= φ ∈ Lℓ

if and only if Ev |= φ, due to the bijection between three-valued valuations
v and partial Boolean models Ev . Given a three-valued logic system, our translation
methodology consists in showing that the following statements are equivalent:
• For a given set B of three-valued formulas and a three-valued logic formula α,
B ⊢ α (using axioms and inference rules of the three-valued logic).
• {T (v(β) ∈ D) : β ∈ B} ⊢ T (v(α) ∈ D) in MEL, where D is the set of designated
truth-values in the three-valued logic (that is, 1, unless otherwise specified).
In the following, we consider four known three-valued logics (Kleene, Gödel,
Łukasiewicz and Nelson-LPF logics) and show that, insofar as the third truth-value means
unknown, they can be expressed in MEL, in the above sense. The first two can be
expressed in, and are less expressive than, the last two. Especially, we show that MEL
restricted to the language Lℓ

exactly captures any of Łukasiewicz and Nelson logics,
as we will see in the next sections. Additionally, we also consider Priest’s logic of
paradox.
5. From Łukasiewicz and Nelson three-valued logics to MEL and back
Łukasiewicz three-valued logic Ł3 possesses a language based on (V,→L ,¬), powerful
enough to express all connectives laid bare in Section 3. It has been axiomatised by Wajsberg
(1931), using the following axioms and the modus ponens rule:
(W1) (α →L β)→L ((β →L γ )→L (α →L γ ));
(W2) α →L (β →L α);
(W3) (¬β →L ¬α)→L (α →L β);
(W4) (((α →L ¬α)→L α)→L α).
The truth-table of the implication→L is given in Table 3. It corresponds to the arithmetic
expression min(1, 1 − x + y). The involutive negation of Kleene logic is recovered as
¬x := x →L 0. The formulas α →L α and ¬(α →L α) correspond to the tautology and
the contradiction, and have truth-values 1 and 0, respectively.
We can also define two pairs of conjunction and disjunction connectives denoted by
(⊓,⊔) and (⊙,⊕). The first pair is Kleene’s, recovered as x ⊔ y = (x →L y) →L
y ∀x, y ∈ 3, and x ⊓ y = ¬(¬x ⊔ ¬y). Numerically, they correspond to well-known
idempotent conorms and t-norms (Klement, Mesiar, & Pap, 2000): max(x, y) and min(x, y),
respectively. The other pair is x ⊕ y := ¬x →L y and x ⊙ y := ¬(¬x ⊕ ¬y) explicitly
described in Table 3. Numerically, they correspond to well-known nilpotent conorms and
t-norms: min(1, x + y) and max(0, x + y − 1), respectively. Then the contradiction 0 is
also expressed as x ⊙¬x .
Table 3. Łukasiewicz implication, conjunction and disjunction truth-tables.
5.1. Translating the basic connectives in Ł3
Łukasiewicz implication is translated into MEL as follows. First, consider the translation
of v(α →L β) = 1. It is important, as inference in Ł3 is based on the propagation of
the designated truth-value 1 across deduction steps. It is clear from the truth-table that
v(α →L β) = 1 if and only if the two Boolean conditions are satisfied:
• if v(α) = 1 then v(β) = 1;
• if v(α) ≥ 12 then v(β) ≥ 12 .
It thus yields the translation, using Boolean conjunction and implication:
T (v(α →L β) = 1)
= [T (v(α) = 1)⇒ T (v(β) = 1)] ∧ [T (v(α) ≥ 12 )⇒ T (v(β) ≥ 12 )].
The translation of T (v(α →L β) = 1) is the same for all the three-valued residuated
implications. Likewise v(α →L β) ≥ 12 only requires that v(β) ≥ 12 whenever v(α) = 1.
The translation is thus:
T (v(α →L β) ≥ 12 ) = T (v(α) = 1)⇒ T (v(β) ≥ 12 ).
In the case of atoms, we can use the modal translations of v(a) = 1, etc., to get
T (v(a →L b) = 1) = (✷a ⇒ ✷b) ∧ (♦a ⇒ ♦b),
and
T (v(a →L b) ≥ 12 ) = ✷a ⇒ ♦b.
Under the epistemic stance, v(a →L b) = 1 thus means: if a is certain then so is b
and if a is possible then so is b. This interpretation was not at all obvious to guess in the
language of Ł3.
The translation of Kleene conjunction and disjunction can be achieved likewise,
although in a simpler way as v(α ⊔ β) = 1 if and only if v(α) = 1 or v(β) = 1, and
v(α ⊓ β) = 1 if and only if v(α) = 1 and v(β) = 1, etc. It is then easy to check that
T (v(α ⊓ β) ≥ i) = T (v(α) ≥ i) ∧ T (v(β) ≥ i), i ≥ 12 ;
T (v(α ⊔ β) ≥ i) = T (v(α) ≥ i) ∨ T (v(β) ≥ i), i ≥ 12 ;
T (v(α ⊓ β) ≤ i) = T (v(α) ≤ i) ∨ T (v(β) ≤ i), i ≤ 12 ;
T (v(α ⊔ β) ≤ i) = T (v(α) ≤ i) ∧ T (v(β) ≤ i), i ≤ 12 .
In the case of atoms, it is clear that
T (v(a ⊓ b) = 1) = ✷a ∧✷b and T (v(a ⊔ b) = 1) = ✷a ∨✷b.
The translation of the connectives ⊙ and ⊕ is:
T (v(α ⊕ β) = 1) = T (v(α) = 1) ∨ T (v(β) = 1) ∨ (T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ∧ T (v(β) ≥ 12 ));
T (v(α ⊕ β) ≥ 12 ) = T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(β) ≥ 12 );
T (v(α ⊙ β) = 1) = T (v(α) = 1) ∧ T (v(β) = 1);
T (v(α ⊙ β) ≥ 12 ) = [T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ∧ T (v(β) = 1)] ∨ [T (v(α) = 1) ∧ T (v(β) ≥ 12 )].
For atoms, we see that
T (v(a ⊕ b) = 1) = a ∨b ∨ (♦a ∧ ♦b),
and
T (v(α ⊙ β) = 1) = a ∧b.
Note that while the truth of Kleene disjunction a ⊔ b corresponds to the requirement
that one of a and b be certain, a ⊕ b corresponds to a very loose view of the disjunction of
two atoms, which remains valid if both conjuncts are unknown. Besides, asserting the truth
of a conjunction in Ł3 leads to the same translation for the two conjunctions (but asserting
falsity would lead to different translations).
The negation ¬α in Ł3 is the involutive one, and its translation clearly yields:
T (v(¬α) = 1) = T (v(α) = 0) = (T (v(α) ≥ 12 ))′;
T (v(¬α) ≥ 12 ) = T (v(α) ≤ 12 ) = (T (v(α) = 1))′.
For atoms, T (v(¬a) = 1) = ✷a′, and T (v(¬a) = 12 ) = T (v(a) = 12 ) = ♦a ∧ ♦a′.
Note that in Ł3 the top and bottom element in 3 are translated (computing respectively
T (v(a →L a) = 1) and T (v(a ⊙ ¬a) = 1)), into ((a)′ ∨ a) ∧ ((♦a)′ ∨ ♦a)
and a ∧ a′, respectively, which are indeed tautologies and contradictions in MEL,
respectively, hence semantically equivalent to ✷⊤ and ✷⊥, respectively.
Example 6. Let us translate axiom (W2) applied to atoms:
T (v(a →L (b →L a)) = 1) =
[T (v(a) = 1)⇒ T (v(b →L a) = 1)] ∧ [T (v(a) ≥ 12 )⇒ T (v(b →L a) ≥ 12 )] =
[✷a ⇒ ((✷b ⇒ ✷a) ∧ (♦b ⇒ ♦a))] ∧ [♦a ⇒ (✷b ⇒ ♦a)].
This Łukasiewicz axiom is translated into a MEL theorem: indeed it is the conjunction
of two tautologies. This result can be generalised to all axioms of Ł3, as we will see in
Proposition 9. On the other hand, we started from a formula containing two literals and
we ended with a MEL formula with 4 literals. That is, during the translation we gain in
interpretability but we lose in terms of complexity of the formula. In the worst case, we may
have an exponential growth in the terms of literals (see Proposition 13).
Let LŁ

be the syntactic fragment of the MEL language obtained by translating truth-
qualified Ł3 formulas into MEL. From the above considerations, it is formed of formulas of
MEL where modalities appear only in front of literals. It is clear that LŁ

⊆ Lℓ

, the MEL
language fragment Lℓ

made of all formulas where modalities are just in front of literals.
From Lℓ

to Ł3, we can actually prove the converse translation is possible:
Proposition 7. For any formula in φ ∈ Lℓ

, there exists a formula α in Ł3 such that φ is
logically equivalent to T (v(α) = 1) in MEL.
Proof. Formulas in the language Lℓ

can be equivalently expressed using
✷a|✷a′|♦a|♦a′|φ ∨ ψ |φ ∧ ψ without the explicit use of an outer negation φ′. So, the
translation θ from Lℓ

to Łukasiewicz logic is recursively defined as (we write θ(φ) as short
for θ(t (φ) = 1)): θ(a) = a, θ(a′) = ¬a, θ(♦a′) = a →L ¬a, θ(♦a) = ¬a →L a,
θ(φ ∧ ψ) = θ(φ) ⊓ θ(ψ), θ(φ ∨ ψ) = θ(φ) ⊔ θ(ψ). 
In particular, Tarski’s translation from ♦α into ¬α →L α is thus recovered, but only if
α is a literal.
To sum up, the image of the language Ł3 via the translation mapping T in the MEL
language L is exactly Lℓ, i.e., its fragment with modalities in front of literals only.
5.2. Using MEL to reason in Ł3
We are now in a position to compare the logic Ł3 and the restriction of MEL to the
sublanguage Lℓ

. Syntactic inference in Ł3 uses Wajsberg axioms and the modus ponens
rule. At the semantic level, if BL is a set of formulas in Ł3 (understood as a knowledge
base), then BL |= α means that whenever v(β) = 1,∀β ∈ BL , we do have that v(α) = 1.
Ł3 is sound and complete with respect to this semantics (Gottwald, 2001). This semantic
inference can be expressed in MEL by
∧β∈BLT (v(β) = 1) ⊢ T (v(α) = 1).
So the question to be addressed in this subsection is whether this inference in the
restriction of MEL to Lℓ

is equivalent to the inference in Ł3 – in other words, whether this
‘sublogic’ of MEL captures the logic Ł3 exactly.
To simplify notation, we may in the following occasionally (especially in proofs) write
T1(α) in place of T (v(α) = 1), and T ≥1/2(α) in place of T (v(α) ≥ 12 ).
First we can generalise the result on the correspondence between theorems in both
logics:
Lemma 8. If α is a formula in Ł3, then T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(α) ≤ 12 ) is valid in MEL.
The proof is by induction on the structure of α.
• α = a. We have T (v(a) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(a) ≤ 12 ) = ♦a ∨ ♦a′ = a ⇒ ♦a, that is,
axiom (D).
• α = ¬β. T (v(¬β) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(¬β) ≤ 12 ) = T (v(β) ≤ 12 ) ∨ T (v(β) ≥ 12 ) and
then, it is sufficient to use induction.
• α = α1 →L α2. So, T (v(α1 →L α2) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(α1 →L α2) ≤ 12 ) is translated
into [T (v(α1) ≥ 12 ) ⇒ T (v(α2) ≥ 12 )] ∨ [T (v(α1) = 1) ⇒ T (v(α1) = 1]′ ∨
[T (v(α1) ≥ 12 )⇒ T (v(α2) ≥ 12 )]′ which is valid since the first and the last terms
together are in the form φ ∨ φ′.
We could prove the same result for other disjunctions of translated truth-assignment of
three-valued formulas, such as, for example, T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(α) = 0) and
T (v(α) = 0) ∨ T (v(α) = 12 ) ∨ T (v(α) = 1). As all three-valued connectives considered
in this paper can be expressed in the language of Ł3, the above results are valid for any
three-valued formula written with the connectives in Tables 1 and 2. Lemma 8 is useful for
proving the following result:
Proposition 9. If α is an axiom in Ł3, then T (v(α) = 1) is a theorem in MEL.
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
The other direction, from MEL to Ł3, would be more problematic. Indeed, in the sub-
language Lℓ
✷
, some of the MEL axioms then become uninteresting or cannot be expressed.
Axiom (D) can be translated back when restricted to literals. On atoms, this axiom reads
✷a ⇒ ♦a whose translation into Ł3 is (a →L ¬a) ∨ (¬a →L a) which is a theorem
since in Łukasiewicz logic any formula of the kind (α →L β) ∨ (β →L α) is a tautology.
✷⊤ can be translated by any Łukasiewicz tautology, say for instance a →L a.
Axioms of Propositional Logic applied to MEL literals can be translated back and it
is possible to check whether they become theorems in Ł3 (this is left to the reader). For
instance, consider Axiom 1 using atomic formula✷a and with any Lℓ
✷
-formula φ, we have:
θ([✷a ⇒ (φ ⇒ ✷a)]) = [(a →L ¬a) ∨ θ(¬φ) ∨ a] and [(a →L ¬a) ∨ a] is a theorem
in Ł3.
In contrast, axioms (M) and (C) cannot be expressed in Lℓ
✷
since ✷(a ∧ b) is not a
formula of this language (even if in MEL, ✷(a ∧ b) and ✷a ∧ ✷b are equivalent). Axiom
RM on BPL literals becomes uninteresting, since a⇒b is never a BPL tautology for distinct
atoms, etc.
We note that the issue of translating MEL axioms to Ł3 is not a real concern for our
purpose. Indeed, here, we are only trying to simulate Ł3 inside MEL. So, we need to
• translate truth-qualified formulas of Ł3 into the language L✷;
• use MEL inference rule to simulate Ł3 modus ponens.
We have seen that the first item is feasible. For the second one, we have to show that
from T1(α) and T1(α →L β) we can deduce T1(β). Now, the translation of T1(α →L β) is
by definition [T1(α)⇒ T1(β)] ∧ [T≥1/2(α)⇒ T≥1/2(β)]. This means that [T1(α)⇒ T1(β)]
is valid and by modus ponens in BPL we get T1(β).
The following proposition is crucial for ensuring the equivalence between the models
of true formulas in Ł3 and the epistemic models of their translation into MEL.
Proposition 10. Let α be a formula in Ł3. For each model v of α, the epistemic state Ev
is a model (in the sense of MEL) of T (v(α) = 1). Conversely, for each model in the sense
of MEL (epistemic state) E of T (v(α) = 1) the three-valued interpretation vE is a model
of α in the sense that vE (α) = 1.
Proof. The proposition can be proved by induction on the structure of the formula α.
First, let us prove that if v(α) ∈ S then Ev is a model of T (v(α) ∈ S), where by ‘∈ S’
we mean = 0| = 1| ≥ 12 | ≤ 12 . If α is a literal, α = a|¬a, then the proof immediately
follows by definition of Ev .
Otherwise, for a general formula, we make the inductive hypothesis: if v(α) ∈ S then
Ev  T (v(α) ∈ S). Then, we distinguish the two cases of
• negation ¬α. Let us suppose that v(¬α) = 1 (the case v(¬α) = 0 is handled
dually). Then, we get v(α) = 0 and by inductive hypothesis: Ev  T (v(α) = 0) =
T (v(¬α) = 1), the last equality being valid by definition of T .
Finally, if v(¬α) ≥ 12 (similarly for v(¬α) ≤ 12 ) it means that v(α) ≤ 12 . By
inductive hypothesis, Ev  T (v(α) ≤ 12 ) = T (v(¬α) ≥ 12 ).
• implication α →L β. First, let us suppose that v(α →L β) = 1. By definition
of →L this is true when (v(α) ≤ 12 or v(β) = 1) and (v(α) = 0 or v(β) ≤ 12 ).
By inductive hypothesis, with the fact that T (v(α) ≤ 12 ) = T (v(α) = 1)′ and
the definition of Boolean implication, we easily get the thesis. The other cases are
handled similarly.
Conversely, if we show that
vE (α) =


1 if E  T (v(α) = 1)
0 if E  T (v(α) = 0)
1
2 otherwise
(1)
then the thesis immediately follows. The case where α is an atom is a simple translation
of the definition of vE . Let us make the inductive hypothesis that equation (1) holds for
generic α, β and prove that it holds also for ¬α and α →L β.
• The case of negation. If E  T (v(¬α) = 1) then E  T (v(α) = 0) and by
induction we get vE (α) = 0 and so vE (¬α) = 1. Similarly, for E  T (v(¬α) = 0).
• The case of implication. If E  T (v(α →L β) = 1) then by definition E 
[T (v(α) = 1) ⇒ T (v(β) = 1)] ∧ [T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ⇒ T (v(β) ≥ 12 )]. This means
that (E  T (v(α) = 1)′ or E  T (v(β) = 1)) and (E  T (v(α) ≥ 12 )′ or
E  T (v(β) ≥ 12 )). By induction we have (v(α) = 0 or v(β) = 1) and (v(α) ≤ 12
or v(β) ≥ 12 ), from which we get the thesis v(α →L β) = 1 by definition of
Łukasiewicz implication.
The case E  T (v(α →L β) = 0) is handled similarly.

Moreover, since the sublanguage Lℓ

is exactly the Łukasiewicz fragment of the MEL
language, putting together Propositions 5, 9 and 10, we obtain the equivalence between
inference in Ł3 and inference in the corresponding linguistic restriction of MEL.
First, from the above results we get the following:
Lemma 11. Let φ be a formula in Lℓ

and θ(φ) its translation in Łukasiewicz logic. If
E MEL φ, then vE L θ(φ), where vE is the unique three-valued valuation associated to
the partial model r(E).
Proof. We proceed by induction.
• φ = a, then θ(φ) = a and vE (a) = 1. So, vE (θ(φ)) = 1.
• φ = a′, then θ(φ) = ¬a and vE (a) = 0. So, vE (θ(φ)) = 1.
• φ = ♦a, then θ(φ) = ¬a →L a and vE (a) ≥ 12 . So vE (θ(φ)) = 1.
• φ = ♦a′. Same as the previous case.
• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2. Then, we know by induction that vE (θ(φ1)) = vE (θ(φ2)) = 1 and
from θ(φ) = θ(φ1) ⊓ θ(φ2) the thesis follows.
• φ = φ1 ∨ φ2. Same as the ∧ case.

Finally, we reach the main equivalence result of this section, showing that insofar as the
third truth-value refers to the idea of unknown, Łukasiewicz logic is exactly captured by a
sublogic of modal logic.
Proposition 12. Let α be a formula in Łukasiewicz logic Ł3 and BL a set of formulas in
this logic. Then, BL ⊢ α in Ł3 iff T1(BL) ⊢ T (v(α) = 1) in MEL.
Proof. Both MEL and Łukasiewicz logic are sound and complete. So, it is enough to
show that BL ⊢ α iff T1(BL) MEL T (v(α) = 1). One direction is the application of
Proposition 10 to the present case and the other is given by Lemma 11. 
Another issue to consider is the complexity of the MEL formulas obtained by the
translation from Ł3. Indeed, we can see that the resulting formula is more complex in the
number of literals compared to the original Ł3 formula, with an exponential growth. When
translating the Łukasiewicz implication, we can already see that T (v(α →L β) = 1) yields
as significantly larger MEL formula. We can quantify this growth in the size of translated
formulas more precisely:
Proposition 13. Let n be the number of literals appearing in an Ł3 formula α and #ℓ1(n)
be the number of (modal) literals in the translation T (v(α) = 1). Then,
#ℓ1(n) ≤ c1
(
1−
√
5
2
)n
+ c2
(
1+
√
5
2
)n
− 3, (2)
where c1 and c2 are constants.
Proof. The worst case is when α is of the form (((a →L b) →L c) →L d · · · ).
For n = 1, 2, it is clear that #ℓ1(1) = 1, #ℓ1(2) = 4 (by checking T1(a →L b)). Let
#ℓ1/2(n) be the number of literals appearing in the translation of v(α) ≥ 12 if α contains n
literals. It is clear that #ℓ1/2(1) = 1, #ℓ1/2(2) = 2 (using T1/2(a →L b)). Now consider
α = (a →L b)→L c:
• T1(α) = (T1(a →L b)⇒ ✷c) ∧ (T1/2(a →L b)⇒ ♦c), so that
T1(α) = (((✷a ⇒ ✷b) ∧ (♦a ⇒ ♦b)) ⇒ ✷c) ∧ ((✷a ⇒ ♦b) ⇒ ♦c) and
#ℓ1(3) = 8.
• T1/2(α) = T1(a →L b)⇒ ♦c = ((✷a ⇒ ✷b) ∧ (♦a ⇒ ♦b))⇒ ♦c
so that #ℓ1/2(3) = 5.
More generally consider the formula α →L b:
T1(α →L b) = (T1(α)⇒ ✷b) ∧ (T1/2(α)⇒ ♦b);
T1/2(α ⇒ b) = (T1(α)⇒ ♦b).
This yields the following recursions, assuming the number of literals in α is n − 1:
#ℓ1(n) = #ℓ1(n − 1)+ #ℓ1/2(n − 1)+ 2;
#ℓ1/2(n) = #ℓ1(n − 1)+ 1.
Injecting the second equation into the first leads to the recursive equation
#ℓ1(n) = #ℓ1(n − 1)+ #ℓ1(n − 2)+ 3.
One can check that this holds for the case n = 3. It can be seen that, up to constants, this
is a Fibonacci series, whose solution can be computed by difference equation techniques
(Elaydi, 1995), yielding expression (2). The constants c1 and c2 can be computed by
substituting the case n = 2 and n = 3 (whose solution is known) in equation (2). 
We can claim, however that this loss in concision is counterbalanced by a gain in
interpretability, as for instance, the meaning of Łukasiewicz connectives in the setting of
incomplete information handling is laid bare by the translation. Indeed, we see that declaring
a →L b as true in Ł3 means (after its translation into MEL): if a is certain, then so is b,
and if a is not impossible, then so is b. Note that if the truth of some atomic propositions
is known and encoded in MEL, such rules can be triggered, and can derive the certainty of
other atomic propositions, in a style very similar to logic programming. One may conjecture
that the behaviour of a rule ‘a ← b1, . . . , bn’ in logic programming can be captured by
means of the formula (✷b1 ∧ · · · ∧✷b2)⇒ ✷a in MEL, expressing facts as ✷a.
5.3. Nelson logic
The three-valued Nelson logic N3 (Vakarelov, 1977), also known as classical logic with a
strong negation, uses the language built on (V,⊓,⊔,→N ,¬,−). It also corresponds to the
LPF logic in Avron (1991). The part of N3 based on the connectives (⊓,⊔,→N ,−) satisfies
the axioms of propositional Boolean logic,
(B1) α →N (β →N α);
(B2) (α →N (β →N γ ))→N ((α →N β)→N (α →N γ ));
(B3) (−α →N −β)→N (β →N α);
and the other negation ¬ satisfies the additional six axioms,
(V1) ¬α →N (α →N β);
(V2) ¬(α →N β)↔N (α ⊓ ¬β);
(V3) ¬(α ⊓ β)↔N ¬α ⊔ ¬β;
(V4) ¬(α ⊔ β)↔N ¬α ⊓ ¬β;
(V5) ¬− α ↔N α;
(V6) ¬¬α ↔N α.
The semantics is given by Nelson algebras (Cignoli, 1986) – that is, Kleene algebras
with residuation, where a further implication x →N y = x →G (¬x ⊔ y) always exists
for any x, y ∈ 3 and it satisfies (x ∧ y) →N z = x →N (y →N z). This implication
is not equal to its contraposition ¬y →N ¬x . An elementary example is the three-valued
Kleene algebra ({0, 12 , 1},⊓,⊔,¬, 0, 1) equipped with Nelson implication →N , given in
Table 4 (left), also =→9 in Table 2. Apart from Kleene implication, it is the only other one
such that (x → y) → x = x . The designated truth-value is 1. The negation −, defined as
−x := x →N 0, is the one we called paraconsistent, such that − 12 = 1 = −0.
Nelson equivalence (Table 4 on the right) is not much demanding and confuses the
values 12 and 0. In fact, if we merge these two truth-values, we are left with Boolean logic
and the two negations will coincide. Besides, we can notice that the deduction theorem
holds in the form v(α →N β) = 1 if and only if v(α) = 1 implies v(β) = 1, which is
false with Łukasiewicz implication, and contrasts with its counterpart in G3; see Section
6.2. Nelson logic also exhibits a constructivist flavour for the notion of falsity, in the sense
that v(−(A ⊓ B)) = 1 if and only if v(−A) = 1 or v(−B) = 1, while in G3, we have that
v(∼ (A ⊔ B)) = 0 if and only if v(∼ A) = 0 or v(∼ B) = 0.
In order to translate all formulas of Nelson logic into MEL, it is sufficient to give the
translation of the implication and the associated negation, the other connectives being the
same as the ones in Kleene logic encountered in the previous subsections via Łukasiewicz
logic.
T (v(−α) = 1) = T (v(α) ≤ 12 );
T (v(−α) = 0) = T (v(α) = 1);
T (v(α →N β) = 1) = T (v(α) = 1)⇒ T (v(β) = 1);
T (v(α →N β) ≥ 12 ) = T (v(α) = 1)⇒ T (v(β) ≥ 12 ).
Table 4. Nelson implication and equivalence on three-values.
For atoms, it holds that
T (v(a →N b) = 1) = a ⇒ b;
T (v(a →N b) ≥ 12 ) = a ⇒ ♦b.
The first identity gives the meaning of Nelson implication in the epistemic approach,
namely if α is certain then β is certain. This implication may look more natural in MEL
than residuated ones or Kleene’s.
It turns out that Nelson implication can be defined by means of Łukasiewicz implica-
tion as
x →N y := x →L (x →L y),
and conversely that Łukasiewicz implication can be defined as
x →L y := (x →N y) ⊓ (¬y →N ¬x)
by contrapositive symmetrisation of Nelson implication (Avron, 1991).
Actually, all the results pertaining to Łukasiewicz logic also apply to the three-valued
Nelson logic N3 = (V,⊓,⊔,→N ,¬,−)due to the equivalence of the two logics (Vakarelov,
1977). The expressive power of N3 is thus the same as Ł3, and their translation into MEL
can be carried out in the same fragment Lℓ

of the MEL language. Conversely, for the
translation from Lℓ
✷
into Nelson logic, we must use θ(♦a′) = −a and θ(♦a) = −¬a.
At the semantic level, an interpretation v in Nelson logic corresponds again to a partial
model Ev of propositional logic, while Proposition 10 relating valuations satisfying Ł3
formulas and MEL-models of their translations still holds for Nelson logic. In particular,
Proposition 9 holds for N3 axioms, just using their translations into Ł3:
Proposition 14. If α is an axiom in Nelson logic, then T (v(α) = 1) is a theorem in MEL.
Proof. Axioms (B1) to (B3) are Boolean axioms, thus they easily follow. We can give
the direct proof for (V1), the other axioms being proved similarly. T (v(¬α →N
(α →N β)) = 1) = T (v(α) = 0) ⇒ (T (v(α) = 1) ⇒ T (v(β) = 1)) =
T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) ∨ T (v(α) ≤ 12 ) ∨ T (v(β) = 1), which is valid in MEL. 
Finally, again using the equivalence between Ł3 and N3, the counterpart of
Proposition 12 is valid for Nelson logic, namely that if a formula in Nelson logic is a
consequence of a knowledge base, it can be proven in MEL using their translations.
6. Special cases
In this section, we consider Kleene and Gödel three-valued logics, which are well known
in the literature and expressible in Ł3, but are also less expressive. We try to figure out
which fragment of the language Lℓ

can carry such logics, bearing in mind that the third
truth-value means unknown. Moreover, we consider a variant of Kleene logic that has been
proposed as a paraconsistent logic, by changing the designated truth-value. Interestingly,
even if its aim is to capture the notion of conflict rather than partial ignorance, this logic
can also be captured in MEL.
6.1. Kleene logic in MEL
The logic that is best known and most often used when it comes to representing uncertainty
due to incomplete information is Kleene logic. The connectives are simply the min ⊓, the
max ⊔, the involutive negation ¬. A material implication x →K y := ¬x ⊔ y is then
derived. The involutive negation preserves the De Morgan laws between ⊓ and ⊔.
As all of these connectives can be defined in Ł3, its language can be considered as
a fragment of the latter. However, the syntax of Kleene logic is the same as the one of
propositional logic (replacing ∧,∨,′ with ⊓,⊔,¬), since only one pair of (idempotent)
conjunctions and disjunctions and only one negation is used. The translation of the basic
connectives into MEL was given in the previous section, including Kleene implication. We
can also define the latter directly as follows using standard material implication ⇒.
T (v(α →K β) = 1) = T (v(α) ≥ 12 )⇒ T (v(β) = 1);
T (v(α →K β) ≥ 12 ) = T (v(α) = 1)⇒ T (v(β) ≥ 12 ).
If α = a, β = b are atoms, we obtain ¬a ∨ b and ♦¬a ∨ ♦b respectively. The
translation into MEL lays bare the meaning of Kleene implication: a →K b is ‘true’ means
that b is certain if a is possible (which may sound like a bold, debatable implication).
A knowledge base BK in Kleene logic K3 is a conjunction of formulas supposed to have
a designated truth-value of 1. We can always transform this base in conjunctive normal
form (CNF), that is, a conjunction of disjunction of literals (without simplifying terms of
the form a ⊔ ¬a),
⊓i=1,...,k ⊔ j=1,...,mi ℓ j (a j ),
where ℓ j (a j ) = a j or¬a j is a three-valued literal. Its translation into MEL clearly consists
of the same set of clauses, where we put the modality  in front of each literal, namely
T1(⊓i=1,...,k ⊔ j=1,...,mi ℓ j (a j )) = ∧i=1,...,k ∨ j=1,...,mi ✷ℓ j (a j ),
where, on the right-hand side, ℓ j (a j ) is now a Boolean literal a j or a′j in propositional
logic.
Example 15. Consider the formula α = ¬(a ⊓ (¬(b ⊔ ¬c))). Then, T (v(α) = 1) =
T (v(a ⊓ (¬(b ⊔ ¬c))) = 0). So, we get T (v(a) = 0) ∨ T (v(¬(b ⊔ ¬c)) = 0) = a′ ∨
T (v(b ⊔ ¬c) = 1) and finally, a′ ∨ T (v(b) = 1) ∨ T (v(¬c) = 1) = a′ ∨ b ∨ c′.
Note that we could more simply have first put α in conjunctive normal form as¬a ⊔b⊔¬c,
and then put  in front of each literal, turning the three-valued negation into the Boolean
one and the three-valued disjunction into the Boolean one.
As a consequence, the fragment of the MEL language that exactly captures the language
of Kleene logic contains only conjunctions and disjunctions of MEL atoms of the forma
or a′:
LK = a|a′|φ ∨ ψ |φ ∧ ψ ⊂ Lℓ.
It is clear that this fragment of Lℓ

forbids negation in front of ✷, as well as material
implication ⇒ between modal atoms. It follows that no axiom of MEL can be expressed
in this fragment. The BPL axioms (RM) and (D) require implication and or negation, and
syntactically ✷⊤ is not part of Lℓ

. The latter point reflects the fact that Kleene logic does
not have any tautology (there is no formula α in K3 such that for all v, v(α) = 1). So, the
translation of any K3 formula having the form of a valid Boolean proposition will no longer
be a theorem in MEL. For instance, take the BPL axiom 1 (also MEL axiom 1) in Kleene
style, i.e., α →K (β →K α),
T1(α →K (β →K α)) = T ≥1/2(α)⇒ T1(β →K α)
= T ≥1/2(α)⇒ (T ≥1/2(β)⇒ T1(α))
= (T ≥1/2(α))′ ∨ (T ≥1/2(β))′ ∨ T1(α),
which is not valid, as (T ≥1/2(α))
′ ∨ T1(α) excludes the case where v(α) = 12 .
At the semantic level we can use Proposition 10 and apply it to Kleene logic, as it is
expressible in Ł3.
Corollary 16. Let α be a formula in Kleene logic. For each model v of α, the epistemic
state Ev is a model (in the sense of MEL) of T (v(α) = 1). Conversely, for each model in
the sense of MEL (epistemic state) E of T (v(α) = 1) the three-valued interpretation vE is
a model of α in the sense that vE (α) = 1.
We can also use the completeness of the restriction of MEL to the language Lℓ

with
respect to partial models of the form Ev (Proposition 5) and specialise it to the Kleene
sublanguage of MEL LK

: if T1(BK ) is the MEL translation of a set of Kleene formulas
(so T (BK ) ⊂ LK), it holds that
T1(BK ) ⊢ T (v(α) = 1) in MEL
if and only if for all v, Ev  T1(BK ) implies Ev  T (v(α) = 1)
if and only if for all v ∈ V, v(β) = 1,∀β ∈ BK implies v(α) = 1 in K3.
In other words, we can use the MEL inference rules applied to the sublanguage LK

to
reason in Kleene logic. We note that the following inference rules that apply to LK

hold in
MEL (Banerjee & Dubois, 2009):
• From a and a′ ∨b, derive b (a special form of modus ponens).
• From a ∨ b and a′ ∨ c, derive b ∨ c (a counterpart to the resolution
principle).
It is then clear that Kleene logic is a propositional logic without tautologies but with
such standard rules of inference.
The above result is to be compared with the fact that we can also capture proposi-
tional logic in MEL. Consider the following fragment of the language of MEL LBPL

=
{α, α ∈ BPL}: then as shown in Banerjee and Dubois (2009) and Dubois et al. (2000),
{✷α1, . . . ,✷αk} ⊢ ✷α in MEL if and only if {α1, . . . , αk} ⊢ α in BPL.
6.2. From three-valued Gödel logic to MEL
Another three-valued logic, known as the here-and-there logic of Heyting (1930), as well
as the three-valued Gödel (1932) logic, is based on the language built from the four-tuple
(V,→G ,⊓,∼), and the axioms are recalled by Pearce (2006). We call it G3:
(I1) α →G (β →G α);
(I2) (α →G (β →G γ ))→G ((α →G β)→G (α →G γ ));
(I3) (α ⊓ β)→G α;
(I4) (α ⊓ β)→G β;
(I5) α →G (β →G (α ⊓ β));
(I6) α →G (α ⊔ β);
(I7) β →G (α ⊔ β);
(I8) (α →G β)→G ((γ →G β)→G (α ⊔ γ →G β));
(I9) (α →G β)→G ((α →G ∼β)→G (∼α));
(I10) ∼α →G (α →G β);
(I11) α ⊔ (∼ β ⊔ (α →G β));
where→G is the residuum of Kleene conjunction ⊓,∼is the intuitionistic negation, and the
Kleene disjunction ⊔ is short for α ⊔ β := [(α →G β)→G β] ⊓ [(β →G α)→G α]. The
truth-tables of the implication and negation are given in Table 5. The first ten axioms are
those of intuitionistic logic. Axiom (I11), due to Hosoi (1996), ensures three-valuedness.
To see this, note the following result:
Proposition 17. Consider valuations that attach values in a lattice L to propositions
in G3. Then, α ⊔ (∼ β ⊔ (α →G β)) is a tautology if and only if L = 3.
Proof. Using the truth-tables, we have that v(α ⊔ (∼ β ⊔ (α →G β)) = max(v(α),
v(∼ (β)), v(α →G β)). It takes value 1 whenever v(α) = 1 or v(β) = 0 or v(α) ≤ v(β).
In order to make all of these conditions false, we must assume 0 < v(β) < v(α) < 1. This
requires at least four distinct totally ordered truth-values. Using three values, the Hosoi
axiom always holds with truth-value 1. 
G3 is again expressible in Ł3 as the Gödel implication α →G β is logically equivalent
to −(α →L β) →L β (Ciucci & Dubois, 2013b), where the paraconsistent negation is
defined by −α = α →L ¬α in Ł3. The intuitionistic negation is then ∼ α = α →L
(α ⊙ ¬α) in Ł3. The logic G3 can also be obtained by replacing the first ten axioms with
those of the continuous t-norm logic BL of Hájek (1998) (based on connectives →G ,⊓,
and constant 0), adding the axiom α →G α ⊓ α to it (ensuring the idempotence of ⊓), and
the Hosoi axiom.
The translation T (v(α →G β) = 1) is the same as for the Łukasiewicz implication.
However,
T (v(∼ α) = 0) = T (v(α) ≥ 12 );
T (v(α →G β) ≥ 12 ) = T (v(α) ≥ 12 )⇒ T (v(β) ≥ 12 ).
In the case of atoms, T (v(a →G b) ≥ 12 ) = (♦a)′ ∨ ♦b = ✷a′ ∨ ♦b = ♦a ⇒ ♦b.
The translationT (v(∼ α) = 1) into MELof Gödel negation is the same as the translation
of Kleene negation. We note that the top element 1 = α →G α and the bottom element
0 =∼ (α →G α) in Gödel logic translate into a tautology, and into a contradiction in
MEL. Their translation is the same as for the Łukasiewicz logic Ł3. In fact, since the Gödel
logic G3 is expressible in Ł3, its axioms, after translation into the language of Ł3, become
theorems of Ł3. So, applying our translation and Proposition 9 yields:
Corollary 18. If α is an axiom of the three-valued Gödel logic, then T (v(α) = 1) is a
theorem in MEL.
Proposition 10 is obviously valid for Gödel logic:
Table 5. Truth-table of Gödel implication and negation.
Corollary 19. Let α be a formula in G3. For each model v of α, the epistemic state Ev is
a model (in the sense of MEL) of T (v(α) = 1). Conversely, for each model in the sense of
MEL (epistemic state) E of T (v(α) = 1) the three-valued interpretation vE is a model of
α in the sense that vE (α) = 1.
Finding the fragment Gℓ

of the MEL language (or of KD) that is necessary and sufficient
to exactly capture this three-valued logic is an open problem. Clearly, Gℓ

is contained
in Lℓ

and includes the formulas {a,a′, a ∈ V} (for the negation) and (✷a ⇒ ✷b) ∧
(♦a⇒ ♦b) (to translate the truth of Gödel implication), and their combinations via con-
junction and disjunction. The difference between the translations of Ł3 and G3 into MEL
only appears with more complex formulas. There is only a tiny difference between the two
translations:
• T1((a →G b)→G c) = ((✷a ⇒ ✷b)∧(♦a ⇒ ♦b)⇒ ✷c)∧((♦a ⇒ ♦b)⇒ ♦c);
• T1((a →L b)→L c) = ((✷a ⇒ ✷b)∧(♦a ⇒ ♦b)⇒ ✷c)∧((✷a ⇒ ♦b)⇒ ♦c).
Regarding inference, note that in G3 (contrary to Ł3), the deduction theorem holds,
that is α ⊢ β if and only if ⊢ α →G β (Hájek, 1998). To prove in G3 that a formula
β is a consequence of a knowledge base BG = {α1, . . . , αn}, one may equivalently try
to prove that the assertion γ = (⊓i=1,...,nαi ) →G β is valid in G3. As a consequence of
Proposition 12, we can do the same after translating the inference problem into MEL, since
the deduction theorem holds in MEL:
Corollary 20. Let β be a formula in Gödel logic G3 and BG = {α1, . . . , αn} a knowledge
base in this logic. Then, BG ⊢ β in G3 iff the modal formula T1((⊓i=1,...,nαi )→G β) is a
theorem in MEL.
Proof. As G3 formulas are expressible in Łukasiewicz logic, valid formulas of the former
become valid formulas of the latter. If (⊓i=1,...,nαi ) →G β is a valid formula in G3 then
it can also be expressed as a valid formula in Ł3. So, we can apply Proposition 12 to the
present case: it says that the translation into MEL of any valid formula in Ł3 is derivable
from the MEL axioms (i.e., is a theorem in MEL). 
Clearly, in MEL, proving that (T 1(⊓i=1,...,nαi )→G β) is a theorem is not easier than
proving T1(β) from (T 1(⊓i=1,...,nαi ). This is left for further research.
6.3. A paraconsistent logic: Priest’s logic of paradox
Priest’s (1979) logic of paradox (PLP) is supposed to tolerate contradictions. In order to do
this, it uses the three truth-values and the connectives of Kleene logic. The difference lies
in the designated truth-values, which are 1 and 12 in Priest logic. Thus, asserting a formula
α means v(α) ≥ 12 in Priest logic, which can be translated as ♦a in MEL when α is atom a.
More precisely, the translation into MEL of propositional variables and formulas of Priest
logic having a truth-degree of at least 12 is similar to the translation of true formulas of
Kleene logic, where we replacewith ♦. More precisely, the translation T (v(α) ≥ 12 ) into
MEL of formulas asserted in PLP follows the rules:
• T ≥1/2(a) = ♦a; T ≥1/2(¬a) = ♦a′;
• T ≥1/2(α ⊔ β) = T ≥1/2(α) ∨ T ≥1/2(β);
• T ≥1/2(α ⊓ β) = T ≥1/2(α) ∧ T ≥1/2(β);
• (Kleene implication) T ≥1/2(α →K β) = T1(α) ⇒ T ≥1/2(β), which is ✷a ⇒ ♦b
(or ♦a′ ∨ ♦b) in the case of atoms. This is a weak implication as the certainty of a
only implies the possibility of b.
Any formula α in Priest logic can be rewritten in conjunctive normal form as
⊔i=1,...,k ⊓ j=1,...,mi ℓ j (a j ),
where ℓ j (a j ) = a j or ¬a j is a literal, without simplifying terms of the form a ⊓ ¬a, in
such a way that v(α) ≥ 12 if and only if v(⊔i=1,...,k ⊓ j=1,...,mi ℓ j (a j )) ≥ 12 . Its translation
into MEL consists of the same set of clauses, where we put the modality ♦ in front of each
literal, namely
∨i=1,...,k ∧ j=1,...,mi ♦ℓ j (a j ),
where ℓ j (a j ) is now a literal a j or a′j in propositional logic. A knowledge base B in PLP
is a conjunction of Kleene logic formulas supposed to have truth-values of at least 12 .
We can always put this knowledge base into disjunctive normal form, which ensures its
direct translation into MEL as a disjunction of conjunctions of literals, with each literal
prefixed by ♦.
In particular, if α has the form of a valid Boolean formula then its translation (following
the above recipe) will also be valid in MEL and it is also valid in Priest logic (PLP α). In
fact, Priest logic has the same valid formulas as Boolean logic.
As a consequence the fragment of the language of MEL that can exactly encode Priest
logic contains elementary formulas of the form ♦a or ♦a′ and is
LP♦ = ♦a|♦a′|φ ∨ ψ |φ ∧ ψ ⊂ Lℓ.
This language is the image of LK

obtained by replacing necessity modalities with
possibility, and is another fragment of Lℓ

. Moreover, we can put any formula in LP♦ back
into the form of a conjunction of formulas of the form ♦(∨i=1,...,kℓi (a j )) due to MEL
axioms.
The notion of consequence is defined in PLP as:
Definition 21. If B is a set of propositions in the language of Kleene logic, then B PLP α
if and only if there does not exist an interpretation v such that v(α) = 0 and for all
β ∈ B, v(β) ∈ {1, 12 }. In other words, if v(β) ≥ 12 , for all β ∈ B then v(α) ≥ 12 .
Priest logic is paraconsistent: we do not have α ⊓ ¬α |=P β, which is not surprising
when translated into MEL, where ♦a∧♦a′ is not a contradiction. The use of Kleene strong
connectives in this approach to paraconsistency thus imposes the choice of the modality ♦
in the translation of atomic assertions in order to capture the behaviour of the logic PLP. In a
recent paper (Ciucci & Dubois, 2013a), we have shown that at the semantic level, asserting
v(a) ≥ 12 , that is Ev |= ♦a, must be understood as follows in the scope of paraconsistent
logic: each classical interpretation w in Ev should be viewed as a fully informed agent
that considers that w is the actual world. So v(a) ≥ 12 means that at least one agent thinks
a is true, and v(a) = 12 clearly means that there is one agent that thinks a is true and
another one that thinks a is false, which explains why in this case, 12 can express the idea
of contradiction.
Modus ponens does not hold in Priest logic, since from |=P a and |=P a →K b we
cannot derive that |=P b; in MEL it is easy to see that, likewise, ♦a, and ♦a′ ∨ ♦b do
not imply ♦b. Likewise, the transitivity of implication is lost in Priest logic. In MEL this
is because from |= ♦a′ ∨ ♦b and |= ♦b′ ∨ ♦c, one cannot infer |= ♦a′ ∨ ♦c. In fact the
disjunctive syllogism fails in Priest logic, and indeed, from ♦a′ and ♦a ∨ ♦b one cannot
conclude♦b. However, all inference rules in Priest logic yield valid inference rules in MEL.
To cite a few:
• ℓ(a) ⊢P ℓ(a) ⊔ ℓ(b); {ℓ(a), ℓ(b)} ⊢P ℓ(a) ⊓ ℓ(b);
• a →K (b →K c) ⊢P b →K (a →K c) (both are ¬a ⊔ ¬b ⊔ c);
• If {a1, . . . , an} ⊢P b then {a1, . . . , an−1} ⊢P an →K b.
In MEL, the last of these rules reads: If♦a1∧· · ·∧♦an ⊢ ♦b then♦a1∧· · ·∧♦an−1 ⊢P
♦a′n ∨ ♦b, which is obvious. So, Priest logic is a propositional logic that has exactly the
same valid formulas as classical propositional logic but lacks the usual inference rules, and
is expressible in a fragment of the MEL language made up of the elementary formulas of
the form ♦a or ♦a′ as well as their conjunctions and disjunctions.
At the semantic level, the epistemic truth-value 0 in PLP plays a role similar to that
of the epistemic truth-value 1 in Kleene logic. Basically, β is a PLP-consequence of α if
v(β) = 0 implies v(α) = 0 for all valuations. It is clear that for any Kleene formula β,
T (v(β) = 0) can be expressed in the Kleene fragment LK
✷
of L✷. Indeed:
• T (v(a) = 0) = ✷a′;
• T (v(¬a) = 0) = ✷a;
• T (v(a ⊔ b) = 0) = ✷a′ ∧✷b′;
• T (v(a ⊓ b) = 0) = ✷a′ ∨✷b′.
So, inference in Priest logic can rely on inference in MEL inside the target language LK

in the form α PLP β if and only if T (v(β) = 0) ⊢ T (v(α) = 0). We can thus capture
inference in Priest logic by propagating falsity instead of truth, using inference rules in
MEL.
7. The modal translation of all connectives
We have seen in Section 3 that fourteen conjunctions and implications can be defined on
three-values according to some intuitive properties given in Definitions 1 and 2. Here, we
give the translations of all of these connectives (in the case of atomic formulas), when the
corresponding formulas have truth-value 1. In Table 6 we can see the translation of all the
conjunctions and in Table 7 of all the implications.
So, we are able to translate all such logics into a unique one, namely MEL, restricting its
language to Lℓ
✷
, where✷ only appears in front of literals.6 We, indeed, recall that due to the
result in Proposition 3, they either coincide with Łukasiewicz logic or can be expressed in
it. So, their translation yields a fragment of Lℓ

. Now, the translation of three-valued logics
into MEL highlights an epistemic semantics for them, and enables a comparison between
them. We can see, for instance, that
• the non-commutative behaviour of some conjunctions translates in a different choice
of modalities in front of literals. That is, we have the translations♦a∧b ora∧♦b
on lines 3 and 4 of Table 6;
Table 6. Translations of all the conjunctions.
Conjunction Translation T1(a ∗ b)
1 (Sette) ♦a ∧ ♦b
2,14 (Sobocin´ski) (♦a ∧✷b) ∧ (✷a ∧ ♦b)
3,12,13 ✷a ∧ ♦b
4,6,10 ♦a ∧✷b
5,7,8,9,11 (Kleene, Bochvar, Łukasiewicz) ✷a ∧✷b
Table 7. Translations of all the implications.
Implication Translation T1(a → b)
1–5 (Sobocin´ski, Jas´kowski, Kleene) ♦a ⇒ ✷b
6,7 (Sette) ♦a ⇒ ♦b
8 ✷a ⇒ ♦b
9,12 (Nelson, Bochvar) ✷a ⇒ ✷b
10,11,13,14 (Gödel, Łukasiewicz, Gaines-Rescher) (✷a ⇒ ✷b) ∧ (♦a ⇒ ♦b)
• the translation of Sette logic reveals the paraconsistent nature of this logic. Indeed,
we can see that true formulas consist in the ones where we have a possibility ♦ in
front of atoms, like for the logic of paradox. But contrary to the latter logic, Sette
implication (line 2 of Table 7) enables modus ponens to be applied;
• on the other hand, Nelson and Bochvar logics are the only two logics such that both
conjunction and implication involve only the  modality.
We have seen that conversely any formula in Lℓ

can be expressed as a formula
in Ł3. Interestingly the part of the MEL language that cannot be mapped to any three-
valued formula includes all formulas where the ✷ modality is put in front of a disjunction
of literals. Note that any MEL formula can be expressed as (for instance) a disjunction of
conjunctions, each term of which is a clause prefixed by ✷ or the negation thereof.
Typically,✷(a∨b) cannot be expressed in Ł3 or in any other three-valued logic. This is
because in such logics, it is impossible to know the disjunction of a and b without knowing
either a or b (only ✷a ∨ ✷b can be expressed in three-valued logics). This sheds light
on the apparent anomalous behaviour of such truth-functional logics, when it comes to
justifying v(a ⊓ b) or v(a →K b) as a function of v(a) and v(b) when these truth-values
are 12 , interpreted as unknown. Neither Kleene truth-tables not Łukasiewicz ones sound
satisfactory (Urquhart, 1986). However, under our translation, the fact that v(a ⊔ b) = 12
is clear in that case because a ⊔ b means ✷a ∨ ✷b, which is indeed false if none of ✷a
and ✷b is true. Truth-functionality in Ł3 reduces to something trivial in MEL. Likewise,
v(a →L b) = 1 if v(a) = v(b) = 12 in Ł3 because in those cases, all of ♦a,♦a′,♦b,♦b′
are true, which makes T1(a →L b) = (✷a ⇒ ✷b) ∧ (♦a ⇒ ♦b) true as well. However,
v(a →K b) = 12 in Kleene logic, because it means✷a′ ∨✷b whose truth we ignore in that
same situation.
This limited expressiveness of three-valued logics of incomplete information is related
to the fact that the only epistemic states that can be captured by Lℓ

are partial models.
The fully fledged MEL logic, even if a tiny part of a general modal logic, allows for any
kind of epistemic state. Note that restricting to partial models for incomplete information is
similar to restricting to probability distributions on Boolean languages made of the products
of marginal probabilities on variables. So our work makes the limited expressive power of
three-valued logic very clear under an epistemic view of truth-values.
8. Conclusion
This work suggests that the multiplicity of three-valued logics is only apparent. If the third
value means unknown, the elementary modal logic MEL, restricting its language to the case
of modalities appearing only in front of literals, is a natural choice for encoding a large class
of three-valued logics that extend Boolean logic. In the framework of a given application,
some connectives make sense whereas others do not, and we can choose the proper logic
accordingly. The merit of our translation, which is both modular and faithful, is twofold:
(1) Once translated into modal logic, the meaning of a formula becomes clear since its
epistemic dimension is encoded in the syntax, even if in the worst case, the size of
a translated formula may grow exponentially in the number of occurrences of the
input variables.
(2) We can better measure the expressive power of each three-valued system. In par-
ticular it shows that the truth-functionality of three-valued logic is achieved at the
cost of a severe restriction of representation capabilities: we can express knowledge
about literals only, which results in a very restrictive use of disjunction.
This work can be extended to more than three ‘epistemic’ truth-values. However, the
target language is then a more expressive modal logic with several necessity modalities
of various strength, such as generalised possibilistic logic (where the epistemic states are
possibility distributions; see Banerjee et al., 2013; Dubois & Prade, 2011). It is a weighted
extension of MEL as well. For instance, the five-valued equilibrium logic (which can encode
‘answer-set’programming; see Pearce, 2006) has been translated into generalised possibilis-
tic logic with weak and strong necessity operators in front of literals, the epistemic states
being pairs of nested partial models (Dubois, Prade, & Schockaert, 2012b). In particular,
we can thus capture answer-set programming in this generalised MEL logic by means of
rules of the form (✷a∧♦b′)⇒ ✷c. However, we need more than MEL to properly account
for negative literals in the body of the rule (♦b′ here).7
The idea of expressing a many-valued logic in a two-level Boolean language (one
encapsulating the other), put to work here, can be adapted to other understandings of the
third truth-value (such as contradictory, irrelevant, etc.) by changing the target language.
We have seen the case of Priest logic here. However, it is very closely related to Kleene
logic, and MEL can still be used as a target logic for the translation by simply replacing
necessities with possibilities. Recent results (Ciucci & Dubois, 2013a) suggest that applying
this technique to other three-valued logics can recover some other paraconsistent logics.
When both incomplete information and conflicting information must be handled conjointly,
preliminary works related to Belnap logic (Dubois, 2012) indicate that a possible target
logic could be a non-regular modal logic such as EMN (Chellas, 1980), restricted to the
language of MEL.
Finally, based on our results, one can conjecture that only in the case where the third
truth-value possesses an ontic nature (that is, when it means half-true, admitting that truth
is a matter of degree) can a straightforward meaning be given to formulas in propositional
languages that use the syntax of the logics of Gödel, Łukasiewicz, etc., and only then can
their violation of the Boolean axioms such as excluded middle or contradiction laws be
intuitively explained, as in the case of formal fuzzy logics (Hájek, 1998).
Notes
1. This paper is an extended and completely revised version of a conference paper (Ciucci & Dubois,
2012).
2. Actually, Łukasiewicz proposed this idea for the study of contingent futures: it is possible that the
battle will be won and it is possible that the battle will be lost.
3. In that paper, the acronym stands for Meta-Epistemic Logic, excluding the case of an agent
reasoning on its own beliefs.
4. The non-emptiness of E is enforced by axiom (D).
5. Belnap (1977) follows another convention where {0, 1} represents a conjunction of truth-values
and encodes the contradiction while the empty set represents unknown.
6. Interestingly, even if MEL has a semantics which can be described in terms of possibility theory
(Banerjee & Dubois, 2009 and Banerjee and Dubois, 2013), possibilistic logic (Dubois & Prade,
2004) cannot encode such rules as they appear in Table 7. Indeed, viewed in the scope of MEL,
possibilistic logic uses graded ✷ modalities (weights that express the strength of belief), but
such formulas can only be combined by conjunctions. Translations of rules such as ♦a ⇒ ✷b,
♦a ⇒ ♦b,✷a ⇒ ♦b,✷a ⇒ ✷b can be captured in generalised possibilistic logic (Dubois, Prade,
& Schockaert, 2012a).
7. Indeed, the behaviour of this negation is not properly captured if ♦b′ = (✷b)′: ♦b′ must dually
correspond to a weaker ✷ modality, as explained in Dubois et al. (2012a,b).
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Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 9
Proposition 9. If α is an axiom in Ł3, then T (v(α) = 1) is a theorem in MEL.
Proof. From Ł3 axioms to MEL.
(W1). T1((α →L β) →L ((β →L γ ) →L (α →L γ ))) is the conjunction of two MEL
formulas, namely
T1(α →L β)⇒ T1((β →L γ )→L (α →L γ )) (11)
and
T
≥
1/2(α →L β)⇒ T ≥1/2((β →L γ )→L (α →L γ )), (12)
which are two tautologies, as we are going to show. The first formula (11) is of the form
φ ⇒ (ψ ∧ χ) = (φ′ ∨ ψ) ∧ (φ′ ∨ χ)
where
φ′ = (T1(α →L β))′ = (T1(α) ∧ T1(β)′) ∨ (T ≥1/2(α) ∧ T
≥
1/2(β)
′),
ψ = T1(β →L γ )⇒ T1(α →L γ )
= [(T1(β) ∧ T1(γ )′) ∨ (T ≥1/2(β) ∧ T
≥
1/2(γ )
′)] ∨ [(T1(α)′ ∨ T1(γ )) ∧ (T ≥1/2(α)′ ∨ T
≥
1/2(γ ))],
χ = T ≥1/2(β →L γ )⇒ T
≥
1/2(α →L γ ) = [T1(β) ∧ T
≥
1/2(γ )
′] ∨ T1(α)′ ∨ T ≥1/2(γ )
= T1(β) ∨ T ≥1/2(γ ) ∨ T1(α)′.
We show that both (φ′ ∨ ψ) and (φ′ ∨ χ) are tautologies.
• (φ′∨ψ). From (T1(α)∧T1(β)′)∨ (T1(β)∧T1(γ )′) we can get (T1(α)∧T1(β)′)∨
(T1(β) ∧ T1(γ )′) ∨ (T1(α) ∧ T1(γ )′). We also obtain a dual expression from the
terms where T1 is substituted by T ≥1/2. So, putting everything together, we have [...]∨
(T1(α) ∧ T1(γ )′)∨(T ≥1/2(α) ∧ T ≥1/2(γ )′)∨[(T1(α)′ ∨ T1(γ ))∧(T ≥1/2(α)′ ∨ T ≥1/2(γ ))]
which can easily be verified as being valid: underlined terms are the negations of
each other;
• (φ′ ∨ χ) is equal by just changing the order of the terms to (T ≥1/2(α)∧ T ≥1/2(β)′)∨
T
≥
1/2(γ ) ∨ (T1(α) ∧ T1(β)′) ∨ T1(α)′ ∨ T1(β).
By distributivity, we have a valid formula from (T1(α)∧T1(β)′)∨T1(α)′ ∨T1(β).
The second formula (equation 12) is of the form:
(T1(α) ⇒ T ≥1/2(β)) ⇒ {[(T1(β) ⇒ T1(γ )) ∧ (T ≥1/2(β) ⇒ T ≥1/2(γ ))] ⇒ (T1(α) ⇒
T
≥
1/2(γ ))} = (T1(α)∧ T ≥1/2(β)′)∨ (T1(β)∧ (T1(γ ))′)∨ (T ≥1/2(β)∧ (T ≥1/2(γ )′)∨ (T1(α)′)∨
T
≥
1/2(γ )).
By distributivity, we obtain the valid formula
T
≥
1/2(β)
′ ∨ T1(α)′ ∨ (T1(β) ∧ T1(γ )′) ∨ T ≥1/2(β) ∨ T ≥1/2(γ ).
(W2) The translation of this axiom is the conjunction of the two formulas
[T1(α)⇒ ((T1(β)⇒ T1(α)) ∧ (T≥1/2(β)⇒ T≥1/2(α)))]
and
T≥1/2(α)⇒ [T≥1/2(β)⇒ T≥1/2(α)].
The second one is valid since x ⇒ (y ⇒ x) is a tautology in BPL for any formula x, y.
The first one can be developed as the conjunction of
T1(α)⇒ (T1(β)⇒ T1(α))
and
T1(α)→ (T≥1/2(β)⇒ T≥1/2(α)).
Again, the first one is valid in BPL, and the second one is valid due to Lemma 8 and
the fact that T1(α)′ = T≤1/2(α). As a result, we showed that the translation of (W2) is a
conjunction of valid formulas, hence valid.
(W3). T1((¬β →L ¬α) →L (α →L β)) is translated into a conjunction of two tau-
tologies. The former is: T1(¬β →L ¬α) ⇒ T1(α →L β) = {[T1(¬β)⇒ T1(¬α)] ∧
[T ≥1/2(¬β)⇒ T ≥1/2(¬α)]} ⇒ {[T1(α)⇒ T1(β)] ∧ [T ≥1/2(α)⇒ T ≥1/2(β)]}, which leads to a
formula φ ⇒ φ in MEL since T1(¬β) ⇒ T1(¬α) = T ≥1/2(β)′ ⇒ T ≥1/2(α)′ = T ≥1/2(α) ⇒
T
≥
1/2(β) and similarly for the other terms.
The second valid formula is: T ≥1/2(¬β →L ¬α) ⇒ T ≥1/2(α →L β) = [T1(¬β) ⇒
T
≥
1/2(¬α)] ⇒ [T1(α)⇒ T ≥1/2(β)] = [T ≥1/2(β)′ ⇒ T1(α)′] ⇒ [T1(α)⇒ T ≥1/2(β)] which is
valid by contraposition of classical implication.
(W4). By a partial translation of the axiom we get the conjunction of the two formulas
[(T1(α →L ¬α)⇒ T1(α)) ∧ (T≥1/2(α →L ¬α)⇒ T≥1/2(α))] ⇒ T1(α)
and
[(T1(α →L ¬α))⇒ T≥1/2(α)] ⇒ T≥1/2(α).
The first one is of the form ((y ⇒ x) ∧ z) ⇒ x which is provably valid in BPL. Also
the second formula is valid as it is of the form (x ⇒ y)⇒ y. 
